This article focuses on two questions in the debate
Introduction
• Economists have long argued that motor carrier regulation encouraged collusion in an otherwise competitive industry and enabled trucking firms to earn monopoly profits. Regulated trucking interests have countered that the industry is characterized by economies of scale, which would, in the absence of regulation, give rise to increasing concentration and monopoly power and profits for a few large carriers. Between these extremes are those who have argued that while regulation permitted prices to rise above competitive levels, monopoly rents were bid away through regulation-induced costs, nonprice competition, or higher union wages. This article focuses on two questions in this debate. First, what effect did regulation have on monopoly rents in the trucking industry? Second, if there were rents, what was their incidence: were they received by owners of trucking firms, dissipated through higher costs, or captured by labor?
The reforms of motor carrier regulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s provide a test of the various hypotheses of regulatory effects on profitability. Analysis is confounded, however, by the plethora of changes occurring coincident with trucking deregulation, in-eluding strikes, an oil price shock, economic recession, and major reductions in regulation of competing transportation modes, particularly railroads. This makes it difficult to link changes in trucking industry profitability directly to relaxation of motor carrier regulation.
To remedy this I use asset market data-specifically, equity share prices of publicly traded trucking firms-to identify the effects of regulatory reforms. Under the assumption of efficient asset markets, asset prices incorporate all relevant information as soon as it becomes available. Thus, the revisions in expected value due to regulatory changes will be reflected in share price movements when the change is first announced or anticipated. The results suggest substantial declines in firms' values in response to Interstate Commerce Commission regulatory reforms, ranging from 8-19% of total value, depending on the type of firm. This is consistent with the predictions of the "monopoly profits" hypothesis, and suggests rejection of the various "no monopoly profits" theories of regulation. Additional information can be extracted by modelling heterogeneous share price responses as functions of companies' operating characteristics. Results from this approach provide some evidence that the Teamsters union shared in monopoly rents and suggest that nonprice competition may have further eroded companies' profits.
The remainder of the article is divided into five sections. The next section outlines competing hypotheses of regulatory effects and develops their predictions for the responses of firm value to different types of regulatory reform. Section 3 discusses the methodology and data. The fourth section presents results from systems where all firms are constrained to have the same response to regulatory events. These permit powerful tests of the effect of reforms on profits, at the possible cost of imposing invalid constraints. These constraints are relaxed in Section 5, where I estimate share price responses to regulatory changes as functions of companies' operating characteristics. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
The incidence of regulation: competing hypotheses
• Motor carrier regulation historically involved three important elements. First, entry into city-pair and commodity class markets was restricted. Second, although the Interstate Commerce Commission was empowered to specify minimum, maximum, and actual rates for most services, it usually ratified the rates set collectively by the carriers themselves. Finally, although some carriers were exempt or partially exempt from direct regulation, the ICC interpreted statutory exemptions quite narrowly, and proscribed the ability of these carriers to operate at minimum cost or to substitute for regulated carriers. I refer to these three elements as entry, rate, and exempt carrier policies.
Five competing hypotheses of the effect of regulation on prices and profits emerge from the academic and political debates on motor carrier policy. These are described below. I present each as argued by its proponents, and develop its predictions for the responses of motor carrier share values to reforms of price, entry, and exempt carrier policies. Although the hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they are presented as such to highlight their differences. I discuss tests of composite theories at the conclusion of this section. Hypothesis 1. Competitive: Regulation had no effect on firms; prices and profits were determined competitively.
Advocates of this view argue that the large number of regulated carriers and the alternative of "exempt" carriage-contract or private carriage-rendered collusion unsustainable, and enforced a competitive outcome in prices. If this model is correct, share prices of trucking firms will be unresponsive to regulatory reforms, as competition, not regulation, determined prices and profits. Although "adjustment costs" incurred in moving to a new regulatory environment may alter this conclusion somewhat, these should have little effect on total firm value.' Significant deviations from zero share price responses to announcements of changes in entry, rate, or substitute carder regulations will suggest rejection of this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Natural monopoly: Regulation reduced prices and profits; in its absence the industry would have been characterized by monopoly prices and profits for a few large carriers.
This view is advocated most often by regulated trucking interests. They argue that in the absence of regulation, economies of scale would enable large carriers to force smaller firms to exit. This would increase concentration and permit large firms to raise prices and to earn monopoly profits. If this argument is correct, removal of price and entry regulation should increase the expected profits of existing large carriers.^ Since the firms in this study are among the very largest in the industry, their share prices should respond positively to reductions in both rate and entry regulation. The eifect of easing exempt carrier regulation is ambiguous. If the reforms allow cream-skimming by private and contract carriers, regulated carriers' profits could decline.^ Otherwise, easing restrictions on exempt carriers seems unlikely to alter significantly the value of regulated firms.
Hypothesis 3. Nonprice competition. Regulation permitted prices to rise above competitive levels, but nonprice competition and cost increases prevented trucking firms from earning monopoly profits. This is similar to the "excess capacity" argument advanced against airline regulation. Advocates argue that collective ratemaking and ICC policy on independent rate filings discouraged price competition and led firms to compete over service quality. Regulation also contributed directly to inefficient and more costly operations, through routing, gateway, and commodity restrictions. If nonprice competition was sufficient to exhaust monopoly rents, so that firms earned only normal profits under regulation, regulatory reforms should reduce prices and service quality, but leave long-run profits unchanged. Firm value will then be invariant to policy changes and thus will mimic the competitive model.'' Hypothesis 4. Teamsters: Regulation raised prices above competitive levels, but the Teamsters union captured the resulting monopoly rents.
Supporters of this view argue that collusion was sufficiently strong and nonprice competition sufficiently limited to ensure that substantial monopoly rents were earned by the trucking ' The presence of adjustment costs may cause share values to decline somewhat under all five hypotheses, but these decreases should be relatively small. As an example, consider a firm with value Vo = ir/(r -g), where ir is the steady-state return to capital each period, r is the real discount rate, and g is the growth rate. If the firm loses 20% of IT for each of the next three years-which would seem to be substantial "adjustment" costs-and it faces a real discount rate of 8% and a real growth rate of 2%, the implied share price decline would be only 3% of the firm's initial value. Substantial share price responses will suggest rejection of the adjustment cost rationale.
Economies of scale alone are insufficient to generate a positive share price response. This model's predictions depend critically upon the strategic interactions of firms in the deregulated environment (e.g., do firms engage in predatory pricing, what is the cost advantage of large firms, is there a substantial first-mover advantage). With zero economic profits under regulation and no significant sunk costs, however, negative share price responses are generally ruled out, even with some probability of predatory pricing.
In addition, most economic studies find no economies of scale. See Spady and Friedlaender (1978) , Friedlaender and Chiang (1981) , and U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce (1978, pp. 107 ff.) for examples. Ericson and Winston (1983) also argue against predatory behavior in the deregulated environment. These suggest grounds independent of this study on which to reject this hypothesis. Because of this, the potential ambiguity surrounding the predictions for share price responses does not seem of great practical concern.
' See Kahn (1971, Vol. 2, pp. 220 ff.) for a discussion of cream-skimming. * If companies take a capital loss on their excess capacity, this conclusion may be somewhat altered. It seems unlikely, however, that this loss would be significant in the trucking industry, where assets are relatively short-lived and an extensive used truck market exists, which extends beyond the regulated trucking industry. "cartel." But the Teamsters union, it is argued, was able to capture the resulting rents. The predicted responses of firm values to deregulation, assuming that the union captured all monopoly rents, depend on the expected union response to declining profits.
Hypothesis 4a.
If the union acts as the residual claimant, then regulatory reforms will not affect firm values.
The value of the Teamsters' claim will fall when rents decline, but as shareholders receive no monopoly profits either before or after the reforms, their claim is unaffected.
Hypothesis 4b. If union wage and compensation packages are sticky downward, then shareholders in unionized firms may lose.
Under this circumstance changes in rate policy should have little effect, as no firm would have an incentive to change prices if all earned only "normal" profits. In contrast, entry of nonunion carriers-either by new companies or by expansion of contract and private carriage-could substantially decrease the value of unionized carriers. Nonunion firms could undercut the prices charged by union companies and thus impose losses on them. If union compensation adjusts with a lag, shareholders of unionized companies will suffer a loss; if the lag is long enough, union companies may be forced to exit from the market. This implies that firm values will decline in response to changes in entry and exempt carrier policy.
Hypothesis 5. Monopoly rents: Regulation enabled the industry to act coUusively; prices and profits both increased as a result.
Academic economists are the strongest proponents of this view. They argue that neither the Teamsters union nor nonprice competition was sufficient to exhaust the monopoly rents created by regulation. Regulated firms consequently realized substantial monopoly profits. This model predicts that firm values will fall in response to changes that reduce the ability of companies to collude or that increase competition. If this model is correct, we should observe share price declines in response to reforms of price, entry, and exempt carrier policies. Table 1 summarizes predicted share price responses under each hypothesis. I consider two approaches to testing these theories. The first is to determine which, if any, of the hypotheses are consistent with the pattern of share price responses to reforms. This may permit us to reject some hypotheses, although rejection in this context implies only that a model is not sufficient to explain the pattern of responses; it generally will not rule out a model's validity as a partial explanation of regulatory rents. The second approach uses differences across firms to investigate composite hypotheses. For example, if unions and companies share profits, then deregulation will decrease share prices, as predicted by the "monopoly profits" hypothesis, but the share price decline for a unionized firm should differ from that for a nonunion firm, ceteris paribus. Modelling differential share price 
Methodology and data
• Conventional approaches to testing the effect of regulation on profitability have serious shortcomings. Data on accounting profits and rates of return are subject to serious errors in measurement and problems of interpretation.' Isolating the effects of regulatory reforms from those of the 1979 Teamsters' strike and lock-out, the oil price shocks of 1979-1980, and the 1981-1982 recession is difficult at best. To avoid these complications I estimate the expected consequences of motor carrier deregulation from movements in trucking companies' share prices. D Methodology. This analysis adopts an "event study" methodology to determine the expected effect of regulatory reform on future profits.* Under the assumption that asset markets are efficient, assets such as shares of equity in a firm will be priced to yield a "normal" expected rate of return with an adjustment made for their risk characteristics. When information that alters the expected stream of future profits is revealed, prices will immediately adjust to reflect the change in value. Measuring the responses of share price to regulatory announcements enables us to infer the revision to expected future profits that results from the information released in the announcement.
The capital asset pricing model is used to measure the expected returns for securities;' the "abnormal" return associated with a regulatory event is the residual from this model. This implies a stochastic return generating process of the following form for a firm / that is possibly affected by regulatory events:
s where Ri, = the return on shares in firm / at time t\ Rf, = the risk-free rate of interest at time t; Rmt = the return on the market portfolio at time t; bis = the effect of event 5 on the market value of firm /; Ds, = an indicator variable equal to one if event 5 occurs at t, 0 otherwise; €" = a serially uncorrelated random error term.
Weekly return data are used, and event responses are measured over the week the reform announcement is made. This should reduce substantially the noise that occurs in the monthly event periods often used in event studies, while allowing for some anticipation of the policy changes.* ' See Scherer (1980) for a summary of the problems of measuring accounting profits. Fisher and McGowan (1983) discuss the difficulty of inferring economic profitability from accounting data.
'See Schwert (1981 ), Binder (1985 , Ruback (1983), and Schipper and Thompson (1983) for examples of this methodology applied to studies of regulation.
' The results presented below impose a constant /3 for each firm over the entire sample period. Allowing each /3 to differ before and after the Motor Carrier Act does not affect the qualitative results, but does substantially increase computational time. The effect of the estimated /3 in explaining returns on individual stocks depends on the product of | 8 and the return on the market portfolio. Because the expected weekly return on the market is on the order of .3%, the results should be robust to even large variations in jS and to exclusion of the market component altogether.
' When the precise timing of a regulatory "event" is uncertain, there is a tradeoff in choosing the length of time over which share price responses are measured. The shorter the time period is, the less noise there will be in measuring the price response. If the event date is not known with certainty, however, using a more narrow window I make three adjustments to apply this framework to the data. First, I control for differences in leveraging across firms. The magnitude of the observed return response of equity capital will be affected by variations in the debt/equity ratio of firms.' The assumption of similar event responses across firms seems most plausibly applied to the response of profits, not to that of equity values. To estimate a common percentage change in profits from equity returns, the event indicator variables for each firm are divided by the share of equity in total firm value. This share should be measured by market values; unfortunately, data on market values of debt, and thus on total firm value, are not readily available. The estimates below use shares based on book values with the understanding that, although these are not perfect measures, they should begin to correct for leveraging effects.
Second, I control for the effect of conglomerates-that is, firms with nontrucking subsidiaries. To account for these, the event responses ideally should be weighted by the proportion of total value accounted for by motor carrier operations. Because the values of individual lines of business are unknown, I weight by the proportion of total corporate book assets attributed to motor carrier operations. This provides a crude adjustment for the effects of nontrucking subsidiaries.
Finally, to increase the precision of the estimates of the capital asset pricing model parameters and the event coefficients, I include a control for changing fuel price expectations during 1979 and 1980. I use the residual return on the Standard and Poor's Airline Index as an indicator of expected future fuel prices, as this index should be sensitive to fuel price changes, but is unlikely to be aflFected by changes in motor carrier regulation.'" This factor is constrained to have the same effect across firms.
Given these adjustments, the basic equation to be estimated for firm /, The disturbance terms, {e,,}, are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated across firms-that is, E^tutjt) = ^o =?^ 0." This implies a system of iV equations of the form (2), where A' is the number of companies.
Event studies typically use one of two polar approaches to estimate a system such as this. The predominant method is to constrain all firms to have the same response to an event. When events affect firms differently, the resulting "average response" can be mis-leading. If however, companies can be grouped by expected similarities in responses, this procedure can be quite useful. The second approach is to allow the event responses to be completely unconstrained across companies-that is, to estimate a unique coefficient for each firm for each event.'^ This avoids potential inconsistencies in the restricted system, at the cost of less precise estimates of the event responses. The low power of hypothesis tests in unconstrained systems severely weakens the ability of the event study methodology to detect the effect of regulation.' ^ A priori information that allows us to impose some structure on the system is required to produce more powerful tests.
This article presents results from two alternatives to the conventional approaches. In Section 4,1 group together companies that face similar regulatory environments, and therefore are likely to have similar responses to regulatory changes. Event responses are constrained to be the same for all firms within a group, but are allowed to differ across groups. This limits the number of parameters to be estimated, while reducing possible inconsistencies arising from constraining responses across dissimilar firms.'"
The assumption of identical responses is relaxed in Section 5, where share price responses to regulatory reforms are parameterized as functions of companies' operating characteristics. This allows each company to have a unique response to regulatory events, without foregoing powerful tests of the effect of reforms on firm value.
D Regulatory reforms and events.
The Interstate Commerce Commission took its first steps toward recognizing competition as a policy objective in 1975. In 1977 the Commission created a Motor Carrier Task Force to study problems with existing motor carrier regulation, and began implementing changes recommended by the group. In the Fall of 1978 there was a tremendous surge in Commission activity that led to a number of proposed rules, final rules, and policy statements all directed toward increasing competition in the motor carrier industry and eliminating the Commission's historic protectionist bias toward existing carriers. Although this was only the start of a very broad reform program by the ICC, much "news" of future regulatory activity was transmitted in this round of regulatory announcements.
Congressional action on regulatory reform was spurred by the ICC's "campaign." Senator Edward Kennedy initiated Congressional hearings on motor carrier regulation in 1977, but Congress did not make progress toward legislation until late 1979. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, passed in June 1980, was above all a compromise. It legislated most of the reforms the ICC had already brought about, but went no further than the Commission had already proposed, and in some cases prohibited the Commission from adopting proposed policies. The Act seems more important for reinforcing the legal position of the Commission and for reducing uncertainty over reform than for contributing independently to the movement toward deregulation.'* Complete deregulation would have removed all entry and pricing controls. Neither the ICC nor the Motor Carrier Act went this far. Nevertheless, substantial reforms were effected. " See Binder (1985) and Schipper and Thompson (1983) for examples of systems unconstrained across firms. Schipper and Thompson do constrain responses to be the same for all announcements within a class; this would be equivalent to constraining all ICC events to have the same coefficients, for example. This seems at least as unsatisfactory as constraining responses to be the same across firms.
" The unconstrained system has only one observation on each response, which does not permit very precise estimation of the responses. The situation does not improve as more companies are added; this simply increases the number of event responses to be estimated. To improve the power of the test against nonzero event responses, additional structure must be imposed on the system. '* The same power considerations that make it unlikely that tests on the completely unconstrained system will reject the hypothesis of no regulatory effects also make it improbable that the cross company restrictions will be rejected, even if company responses do differ. By grouping on the basis of economic information about the firms, however, we may have more confidence that the constrained response measure is meaningful.
" The Motor Carrier Act certainly had an effect, but much of this resulted from its implementation of policies previously proposed by the ICC.
with the result that: (1) obtaining even broad ICC operating authority became simpler and almost certain, (2) independent pricing policies were greatly facilitated, and (3) restrictions on private and contract carriers were eased.
The election of Ronald Reagan and his appointment of Reese Taylor as ICC Chairman altered the regulatory climate once more. Reagan was identified throughout his campaign as pro-Teamster, and Taylor's appointment was strongly criticized by the press and deregulation advocates. Because Taylor interpreted the Commission's discretionary authority more narrowly than did his immediate predecessors, he provoked complaints that he was impeding implementation of the 1980 Motor Carrier Act and reversing procompetitive policies.'* Responses to these post-1980 policy changes are included to estimate possible gains from some degree of renewed protection. Table 2 reports the events used in this analysis; they are described in more detail in Appendix A. The list includes ICC actions before the 1980 Motor Carrier Act, Congressional actions leading up to the Motor Carrier Act, and "reregulatory" actions taken by the Reagan Administration after the Act. There are nineteen events between 1978 and 1981: ten are ICC events, six are Congressional events, and three are events after the Act. Only actions ROSE / 307 that were judged to have significant news content were included." Many important regulatory changes have been omitted, as they seem to have been anticipated.
Share price responses to these events measure the expected change in future profits resulting from the new information released by the announcement. Because the press reports and trade discussion suggest that the majority of these announcements were of unexpected policy changes-this applying particularly to the early ICC events-I shall interpret the event coefficients as estimates of the effects of the reforms themselves. If the announcements were partially anticipated, my estimate will understate the total effect of the policy change.
n Description of sample firms. This study focuses on 32 publicly traded companies engaged in motor carrier operations.'* The sample comprises large intercity carriers, although there is considerable diversity within this class, both in size (from 122 million to 6.7 billion tonmiles in 1978) and in efficiency of operations (as inferred from 1978 operating ratios of 86% to 101%). This suggests that there may be enough variation across firms to model heterogeneity in responses, but that one should be cautious in interpreting the results. This is not a random sample of trucking firms, and although the conclusions may extend to other large trucking companies, they may not reflect the responses of smaller carriers or of the industry as a whole. The firms are divided into three subsamples.
Sample I: general commodity carriers, continuous trading. The 16 firms in this group are general freight common carriers that were publicly traded over the entire 1977-1981 sample time period. General freight carriers are authorized to carry a wide range of commodities, but historically were confined to narrow geographic markets. Their traffic consists largely of less-than-truckload shipments, which necessitate rather extensive networks of terminals for sorting and consolidating freight. These firms are heavily unionized.
Sample II: specialized commodity carriers. This group consists of 10 specialized commodity carriers that were publicly traded over the entire 1977-1981 period. Special commodity carriers are authorized to transport shipments that are excluded from the general freight classification and often require special equipment, such as tank trucks, refrigerated trailers, or auto carriers. These firms historically were restricted to a narrow range of commodities, but given broader geographic authority than were the less-than-truckload firms. They engage almost exclusively in truckload transportation, which eliminates the need for terminals. Some firms offer contract, as opposed to common carrier, service. This sector frequently uses owner-operators to transport loads, and its level of unionization is quite low. These companies differ considerably from general commodity common carriers and from each other.
Sample III: general commodity carriers, interrupted trading. The six firms in this group are similar to those in Sample I, except that trading in their shares was suspended at some point during the 1977-1981 period or stopped before December 1981, most frequently as a resuU of takeovers and Chapter XI bankruptcy filings. It is likely that these events were anticipated for at least some of these firms. If so, this may increase the noisiness of their share price movements and reduce their usefulness in assessing the effects of deregulation. These com-" Preliminary work with a sample of six companies included two additional ICC events before September 1978, one additional ICC event during 1980, and two additional post-Motor Carrier Act events. These events had zero effect, in both size and statistical significance of the coefficient. They are therefore excluded.
" Excluded from the study are household goods carriers, firms specializing in leasing activities, and eleven publicly traded trucking companies failing to meet three criteria: (1) the proportion of assets attributable to motor carrier operations was greater than 10%; (2) the number of days stock failed to trade was less than 30% of the days the market was open (measured during the fourth quarter of 1978); and (3) the company was publicly traded from January 1978 through at least December 1979.
panies are included because they seem likely to have been most strongly affected by regulatory changes, since the companies most hurt by deregulation are more likely to fail.
The incidence of regulatory rents: constrained results
• This section presents system estimates for each of the three samples of companies, with event coefficients constrained to be the same for all companies within each group." Samples I and II each contain 259 weekly observations from 1977-1981, which are used to estimate equation (2) with the full set of 19 events. Sample III comprises firms without complete trading histories; the observation period for these is [1977] [1978] [1979] . Responses for this group are estimated only for the ten ICC events.
Cumulative responses to ICC, Congressional, and post-Motor Carrier Act events are reported in Table 3 .^° Individual event coefficients are reported in Table 4 . Although many of the event coefficients are small or imprecisely estimated, the data do identify strong and statistically significant cumulative effects from the ICC's regulatory actions.^' I discuss the results for each sample below. " The regressions "dummy out" some firms during weeks when takeover bids or similar announcements were made coincident with a regulatory announcement.
The correct method for computing the cumulative effect is to calculate the effect of each event conditional on the previous events' having occurred. The difference between using this method and using the simple sum of event coefficients is negligible (on the order of .005). Hence, to simplify the computation of standard errors, I report cumulative effects as Z5,.
The total Congressional effect is computed as the sum of C2 through C6 minus C/, because Cl was judged to contain news decreasing the likelihood of Congressional deregulation, while the others were judged to contain news increasing the likelihood of Congressional deregulation.
' The hypothesis that the cumulative ICC effect is zero can be rejected at the .01 level for all three samples. The null hypothesis that all event coefficients are zero can be rejected at the .01 level for Sample I, and at the .10 level for Sample III. It cannot be rejected for Sample II. The likelihood ratio test statistics are 41.76 for Sample I and 16.54 for Sample II, which are distributed as x^( 19) under the null hypothesis of no event effects. The likelihood ratio test statistic is 17.18 for Sample III, which is distributed as x^lO) under the null hypothesis. Tables  3 and 4 , suggest significant negative responses to ICC reforms overall, and to each class of ICC policy action. Entry reforms decreased values by 9.6% (standard error. 2.9)^ rate reforms by 5.0% (1.8), and exempt carrier reforms by 4.6% (2.6), for a total 19.2% (4.4) average decline in the value of these large general freight common carriers. The market anticipated substantially lower profits as a result of regulatory reform, which implies rejection of all but the "monopoly profits" hypothesis of regulation as a single explanation of the results. As discussed eariier, we cannot reject the partial truth of other hypotheses; we only conclude that no one other hypothesis is sufficient to explain the results. The results suggest that anticipation of a more liberal entry policy reduced expected profits considerably.^? Three of the four entry policy reforms had among the strongest individual effects on value. ICCEl, which proposed to consider rates in entry apphcations, was estimated to decrease value by 3.2% (1.3), while ICCE2, which limited protests of entry appHcations, led to a 5.2% (1.8) decline in value. The coefficient on ICCE4, although somewhat smaller, implies a 2.2% (1.3) loss in value.
D General freight carriers: 1977-1981. Sample I results, reported in column one of
The other striking individual reform is the Commission's proposal to consider profits when deciding rate cases (ICCRl). This results in a sharp drop in value, estimated at 5.5% (1.3). With the exception o{ICCE4, the later ICC events typically had much smaller effects. This is consistent with the ICC policy's being anticipated after the initial deregulatory surge in the early Fall of 1978, or with the later changes' not having an effect on firms' profits. Given the description of the later policy reforms, the first explanation seems more plausible.
The Congressional and post-Motor Carrier Act events contrast sharply with those for the ICC. The results do not identify any important effects of Congressional and post-Motor Carrier Act actions. The three largest event responses are all below 2%: C2 at -1.7% (1.3), C3 at -1.9% (1.3), and P3 at 1.9% (1.3). The cumulative effect of Congressional action is -3.4%, with a large standard error (3.2%). The cumulative response to events after the Motor Carrier Act is both substantively and statistically insignificant, at -H.7% (2.2). Although the event study methodology cannot distinguish the hypothesis that an action had no economic effect from the hypothesis that it was anticipated or that the event was imperfectly timed, it does not appear that these actions significantly revised expectations.
D Special commodity carriers.
The estimated responses for special commodity firms appear in column two of Tables 3 and 4 . Neither Congressional nor post-Motor Carrier Act events had any discernible effect on these companies; point estimates for the cumulative effects were smaller than 2% for both classes of events and were not statistically significantly different from zero. The ICC results differ substantially from those of the general freight carriers. First, the magnitude of the regulatory effects is much smaller for this sample. The total ICC effect is -8.8% (3.6)-less than half the decHne estimated for Sample I companies. Second, revisions to exempt carrier and rate policies had virtually no influence on values, with cumulative effects estimated as -.8 (2.1) and -1.4% (1.8), respectively. Specialized carrier values responded very little to the November 27, 1978, rate decision that so strongly affected general freight carriers-the point estimate for the coefficient oflCCRl is only -1.4% (1.4). Virtually all of the ICC effect on values was felt through entry decisions, which accounted for a total 6.7% (2.3) decline.
This pattern of responses is difficult to interpret. Although the negative response to entry reforms and the near-zero response to rate reforms are most consistent with the Teamsters hypothesis, these firms are predominantly nonunion. Therefore, while the cumulative response suggests that deregulation reduced the profitability of specialized carriers, these results do not conclusively distinguish among hypotheses.^ The events may have reduced expected profits both directly, by implementing reforms that altered industry structure, and indirectly, by signalling a shift in the Commission's general philosophy, toward competition and away from protectionism. I interpret the events as having the first effect only; recognition of the second implies that our ability to distinguish responses to particular types of reforms is more limited.
D General freight carriers: 1977-1979.
Results for the six general freight carriers in Sample III are reported in column three of Tables 3 and 4. The total ICC effect is estimated at -14.6% (5.7), somewhat smaller than the Sample I estimate, but within one standard deviation of it.^^ This suggests that the market expected a pronounced fall in profits as a result of the regulatory reform, and it indicates rejection of the competitive, nonprice competition, and natural monopoly hypotheses.
The responses by type of policy are more difficult to interpret, as they are estimated quite imprecisely. The point estimates of the effects of all three classes of reforms are negative: -5.9% (3.8) for entry, -2.0% (2.4) for rate, and -6.7% (3.4) for exempt carrier reforms; but only the estimate for the exempt carrier reforms is statistically significant. Rate policies appear to have less influence, and exempt carrier policies more influence, on the values of Sample III firms, relative to their effects on Sample I companies. The large standard errors surrounding these estimates do not encourage one to draw strong conclusions from these data. As a consequence, we cannot distinguish among versions of the two remaining hypotheses: Teamsters or monopoly profits.
The incidence of regulation: modelling cross-firm heterogeneity
• Further information may be gained from modelling share price responses to regulatory reforms as functions of companies' operating characteristics. This has two advantages over the approach used in the previous section. First, it uses heterogeneity among firms to test composite hypotheses of regulatory effects. Second, it allows us to relax the constraint of identical responses across firms while retaining powerful tests of regulatory effects. The discussion and results below are suggestive of this technique and its usefulness in testing hypotheses about the incidence of regulatory rents. The estimated effects are, however, often imprecise or sensitive to changes in the sample and specification. Further research is necessary to construct a complete model of the determinants of responses to regulatory reform in the trucking industry.
To apply this approach, I consider four variables that may influence responses to regulatory change:^'* LTLPER = the percentage of revenues from less-than-truckload traffic. This is a measure of how much of a firm's business was in the more insulated, potentially more lucrative less-than-truckload segment of the industry. UNION = percentage of traffic handled by union drivers.^^ If the union captures part of the monopoly profits, then share price responses should be sensitive to the extent of unionization in the company.^* Whether the effect is to increase or " The estimated responses for Sample III may be smaller owing to the effect of greater leveraging for these companies. But the hypothesis that ICC event responses are the same for Sample I and Sample III companies cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. The likelihood ratio test statistic for this hypothesis is 15.8, which is distributed as x^(lO).
" In preliminary work I considered three additional variables: total ton-miles of freight (a measure of size), network density, and network connectivity (intended to measure network quality). Total ton-miles was excluded as it added little to the explanatory power of the system. Network quality variables were available only for selected general freight carriers. I therefore chose to limit the analysis to the four variables described in the text. The results are sensitive to the choice of variables; this may be partially owing to coUinearity among the variables and partially owing to specification errors.
" Because data on the proportion of union drivers were not available, I use (1 -RENT), where RENT is the fraction of total miles accounted for by vehicles rented with drivers. These drivers typically are "owner-operators," who have little or no union attachment. This measure is used to represent the potential share of union labor. For Ovemite Transportation, the only nonunion less-than-truckload carrier in the study, this variable is set equal to zero, to reflect the fact that its drivers are all nonunion.
' If the Teamsters impose adjustment costs on unionized firms, through the maintenance of rigid work rules, for example, then unionized companies may lose even if the union does not share in monopoly rents. It seems unlikely, though, that the union would be simultaneously too weak to capture a share of monopoly rents and sufficiently strong to impose costly work rules.
to decrease share price responses depends on whether or not union compensation is sticky downward. OPRATIO = the ratio of operating expenses to operating revenues. This is a crude measure of the efficiency of a firm's operations, given common prices. High operating ratios may be indicative of higher quality service^-that is, firms that have moved further out along a cost curve through nonprice competition-or they may be associated with higher cost "marginal" carriers-that is, firms with higher costs for any given output and quality, which have been insulated from pressures to exit by regulation. A VLOAD = average size of load in tons. This is included as a possible measure of nonprice competition. As firms increase the fi:«quency of their service, we expect average load to decline. The variable A VLOAD therefore may be inversely related to the level of service competition.
Data on these characteristics are available for 28 of the 32 companies in this study. These include fifteen carriers from Sample I, seven from Sample II, and all six from Sample III. Because the system includes Sample III companies, it is estimated on 149 observations from 1977-1979, and therefore is limited to ICC events. I focus on the six events that appeared to have significant effects in the previous section: ICCEl, ICCE2, ICCE4, ICCRI, ICCXl, and ICCX2.^^ Responses are modelled as linear functions of the operating characteristics: This allows operating characteristics to have a unique effect for each event. Results from this system are reported in Appendix B. I also estimate the system by restricting the coefficients on operating characteristics to be the same for all events within each policy class (entry, rate, and exempt carrier), but allowing each event a unique constant (4>os)-These restrictions cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance.^* I therefore discuss the restricted results below. The conclusions are not materially affected by this decision. Table 5 reports the heterogeneous system results, with the coefficients on the operating characteristics constrained to be the same for all events within each policy class. Two general features of these results are noteworthy. First, mean share price responses in this system are quite precisely estimated. All six events have negative and statistically significant mean responses, and yield a cumulative mean effect of -17.1%. Second, we can identify differential responses based on firm characteristics. The hypothesis that the coefficients on operating characteristics, exclusive of the constants, are all zero is rejected at the .005 level.^'
The operating characteristics have similar patterns of effects on responses to rate and entry events. The less-than-truckload percentage has no discernible effect on share price responses; the point estimates are both substantively and statistically insignificant. Average load size has a negative effect on share responses, although the standard errors are quite large. For example, the coefficient for rate reforms, -.005 (.004), implies a .5% decline in share price for a one ton increase in average load. This inverse relation is consistent with the presence of nonprice competition, which would tend to reduce both average " Neither mean responses nor coefficients on operating characteristics were substantively or statistically significant for the four omitted events (ICCE3, ICCX3. ICCX4. and ICCR2) .
" The likelihood ratio statistic to test the hypothesis of homogeneous coefficients within each event class is 4,08, which is distributed as x^ (12) under the null hypothesis of the restricted model. This cannot be rejected at even the ,50 level.
' The likelihood ratio test statistic is 47.5 for the test of Ho: 4>], = 0 for all events s and all characteristics 7, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. This is distributed as x^24) under Ho. The critical value for x^(24, .005) is 45.56. load size and profitability. The lower profits of companies engaged in nonprice competition should imply smaller share price declines in response to deregulation. The effect of operating ratio may have a similar interpretation. The OPRATIO variable is estimated to have a significant positive effect on share price responses to rate and entry events. The coefficient for ICCRI, .95 (.27) implies approximately a 1% increase in share price for a one percentage point increase in a firm's operating ratio. This suggests that relatively high cost companies lose less from rate reform than do lower cost carriers. Similar inferences apply for entry reforms, with a coefficient on OPRATIO of .61 (.17). These results are consistent with the service quality interpretation of operating ratio: higher quality firms have higher operating ratios and lower profits, since part of their rents have been absorbed in service competition. Their share price responses to reforms that introduce price competition will be smaller to reflect these lower profits. But the entry results may be consistent also with a version of the "marginal firm" interpretation of operating ratio. If carriers were inefficient because of regulatory restrictions, easing these restrictions could provide the opportunity to lower costs and to improve the competitiveness of their operations by improving route structure and network operations.F inally, unionization appears to have a negative effect on share price responses to entry and rate events: a coefficient of -.030 (.014) for entry reforms and -.072 (.027) for rate reforms. This finding suggests some support for the hypothesis of union profitsharing, as the other theories all predict that unionization should be irrelevant. It appears, however, that the union was not expected to reduce its claim proportionately with lost monopoly rents. The negative coefficient implies that unions imposed adjustment costs on the firms, which disadvantaged companies that were more dependent on union drivers. The imputed costs are substantial. For ICCRI, for example, decreasing the fraction of union drivers to zero from the sample mean of .763 is sufficient to eliminate the entire decline in share values, when all else is held constant at the sample means. Friedlaender and Chiang (1981) discuss the presence of economies of scope in trucking operations, and argue that regional carriers may have been less efficient in a regulated environment because of route restrictions.
The results for exempt carrier reforms create a puzzle, as the signs of the coefficients are virtually all reversed for these events. The variable LTLFER has a pronounced negative effect on share price responses, estimated at -.058 (.018). This is surprising, as private and contract carriers are better substitutes for truckload than for less-than-tmckload carriers. Greater declines for less-than-truckload firms may reflect their better protection and higher profits before reform. Average load has a small and imprecisely estimated positive eflect. The variable OPRATIO has a negative eflect, estimated at -.38 (.18 ). This seems inconsistent with the service competition interpretation applied to OPRATIO for rate and entry events, although it may be consistent with the marginal carrier interpretation of OPRATIO: less efficient carriers may be aflected most adversely by reforms that enable other carriers to compete more eflectively, but that leave their own operations untouched. The coefficient estimate implies that a one percentage point increase in operating ratio increases the mean share price decline by .4%, when all else is held constant. The coefficient on UNION is positive and statistically significant, at .034 (.015). The sign would be consistent with a model in which the union takes a constant share of profits by smoothly adjusting its level of rents to decreases as well as increases in profitability. But this cannot be reconciled with the explanation for the rate and entry reform results.
These findings have mixed implications for the various models of regulatory rents. The central finding of the previous section-that all three types of regulatory reforms substantially reduced expected profits-is strengthened by the results of this heterogeneous response system. The total impact of these six events, evaluated at mean responses, was a 17% decline in share value. The results also indicate substantial heterogeneity in share price responses, even among the relatively similar firms in this sample. In particular, the extent of unionization and the level of service quality appear to aflect share price responses, although the directions of these effects are not consistent across types of reforms. While not conclusive, this evidence suggests that further research into the "Teamsters" and "nonprice competition" models may help to explain the incidence of regulatory rents. ^'
Conclusions
• Share price data indicate that regulatory reforms significantly reduced the expected future profits of firms in the motor carrier industry. The results are consistent with the presence of monopoly profits for trucking firms in the pre-1978 regulatory environment. The negative effects of deregulation on motor carrier profits are corroborated by indicators such as bankruptcies, merger rates, the volume of new entry, trucking price indexes, and the terms of labor contracts. This study links the losses directly to govemment actions, and thus circumvents identification problems inherent in studies that use these indicators or other annual data to assess the impact of regulatory reforms.
The results reveal an average loss of 31% of the prereform equity value of general freight carriers as a consequence of the Interstate Commerce Commission's deregulation campaign.
" Independent evidence on nonprice competition is not readily available. There is no indication of increasing average load size for sample companies over the 1972-1982 period, as might be indicative of declining nonprice competition after deregulation. This is not particularly surprising, however, as simple indicators such as this are subject to the confounding influence of such factors as the 1980-1981 recession.
I have investigated the interactions of the Teamsters union with regulation in greater depth, and my results confirm the finding of union rent-sharing suggested here. In a study of union wage differentials (Rose 1985a) , I find that union compensation was reduced by at least 10% as a result of deregulation. Using an approach similar to that of Salinger (1984) , my investigation of the division of rents between the union and owners of trucking firms (Rose, 1985b) suggests that the union was able to capture roughly 60% of total regulatory rents. beginning in 1978. The corresponding loss for specialized commodity carriers averaged 15%. The implied present value reduction in profits totalled more than $550 million for the 32 companies in this study.^^ The data also indicate considerable variations across firms in share price responses to deregulation, with declines ranging from 4 to 43% of equity value. These illustrate the potential errors induced by constraining companies to have the same response to events, and they underscore the importance of modelling cross-firm variations in regulatory effects.
The results enable us to reject the "natural monopoly" and "competitive" models of trucking regulation. They provide weak evidence on the hypotheses that unions and nonprice competition reduced the level of monopoly rents. Although we reject the versions of these hypotheses that argue that profits were entirely dissipated through increased costs, it appears that variations in firms' responses to deregulation are related to unionization rates and possibly to measures of service quality. This suggests that regulatory rents may have been partially eroded through higher labor costs and service competition.
This work suggests several possibilities for future research. First, this approach could be applied to other modes of transportation. This seems promising, given the rich history of regulatory reforms in the airline and railroad industries. This technique can be used not only to evaluate the own-industry effects of deregulation of other transport modes, but also to identify substitutabilities and complementarities between transport services. For example, by examining the response of railroad values to trucking regulation, or vice versa, we may be able to determine the extent of interdependence between these modes. Finally, the interactions of regulation and unions that are suggested by the results of this study merit closer attention. A study of the Teamsters union's response to deregulation could provide valuable insights about how govemment regulation transfers profits between labor unions and capital owners. This last area is the subject of current research.
revisions in both practice and philosophy with respect to new entry, and were likely to have signalled how the ICC would approach regulation in the future, ICCE2. The Commission adopted new rules on October 27,1978, that sharply limited protests of entry applications. On February 13, 1979 , the ICC adopted the policy proposed in September 1978 to consider rates as a factor in operating rights decisions, ICCE4. The Commission adopted a policy on October 17, 1979 , that emphasized competition in licensing decisions, and shifted the burden of proof to those protesting entry applications.
ICCE3.
Restrictions on exempt and partially exempt carriers.
ICCXl. On November 7, 1978, the ICC Division 2 decided a case based on allowing a contract carrier to serve more than eight shippers. This may have signalled the Commission's abolition of the "rule of eight" on January 8, 1979.
ICCXL On November 20, 1978, the ICC authorized private carriers to apply for authority to conduct a regulated for-hire trucking business in addition to their exempt private carriage operations. This was the first step toward relaxing restrictions on private carriage.
ICCX3. The Commission decided on December 11, 1978, to expand the exempt zones surrounding airports, in which freight hauling was unregulated. Although the decision was not announced until January 11, 1979, this week is included as information on the Commission decision may have been available at the earlier date.
ICCX4. During this week, the ICC eliminated the "rule of eight" for contract carriers (on January 8, 1979), and served the airport zone expansion decision (on January 11, 1979), D Congressional events. Only events that seemed to surprise Congressional observers or that marked a revival of Congressional attention to motor carrier deregulation are included in the list of Congressional events. C3. On March 6, 1980, the Senate Commerce Committee voted to retain a provision narrowing antitrust immunity for collective ratemaking in the trucking industry. This vote sparked an intense telephone and telegram campaign against the bill. On March 11, 1980 , the Commerce Committee reported S. 2245 to the Senate floor and kept the antitrust provision intact, by a 13-4 vote. Senate approval of the bill in the same proportions as the committee vote was expected to follow. C5. On May 22, 1980, a House panel approved legislation after private negotiations with key Senators and the White House and thus avoided the need for a conference committee, where it was feared that the bill would be weakened.
C4.
C6. Despite fears that the coalition supporting deregulation in the House had weakened, the House approved the agreed upon bill on June 19, 1980, D Post-Motor Carrier Act events. Although changes in regulatory policy implemented under the Reagan Administration may identify the expected effects of some degree of "reregulation," isolating particular events that revised expectations is difficult. Three events are included in the study with the recognition that identifying any effect may be quite difficult.
PI. Reagan was elected President on November 4, 1980. Given Reagan's endorsement by the Teamsters union, the market may have inferred likely changes in trucking regulation from his election.
P2. On September 28, 1981, the ICC ruled that applications from 52 firms to approve discount rates naming particular shippers were illegal. This decision called into question numerous discount tariffs that had been filed since enactment of the Motor Carrier Act, Also during this week, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the ICC's broad restriction removal and certification process.
P3. On October 14, 1981, the Commission issued a blanket order rescinding all existing permissions for individual discount rates.
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Appendix B
• Table Al reports results from the heterogeneous responses model. 
